LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Brandon L. Garrett*

University of Virginia School of Law
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903-1738
(434) 924-4153
bgarrett@virginia.edu

March 1, 2018

© Brandon L. Garrett, 2018

* White Burkett Miller Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Justice Thurgood Marshall
Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Many thanks to John
Duffy, Margaret Hu, Mike Livermore, Wayne Logan, and Richard Schragger for invaluable
comments on earlier drafts.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3133213

LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

Abstract
The Supreme Court frequently relies on state law when interpreting
the U.S. Constitution. What is less understood is the degree and manner in
which the Supreme Court and other federal courts look not to state law, but
to local law. Although it has largely gone unnoticed, there is a robust
practice of acknowledging and accounting for local law in the course of
constitutional interpretation. To take an example, one area in which the
Supreme Court has examined local enforcement patterns is in death penalty
jurisprudence. In 2015, Justice Stephen Breyer, dissenting in Glossip v.
Gross, cited to empirical data to raise an Eighth Amendment arbitrariness
concern with geographic variation in local practice, where in a five-year
period, “just 29 counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted
for approximately half of all death sentences imposed nationwide.” In other
rulings, judges seek to minimize constitutional interpretations that might
disrupt local law and practice. As is done with respect to states, judges take
into account whether local practices are outlying or common. Judges also
look to local law and practice to inform the development of constitutional
norms. This Article analyzes and defends reliance on local law and practice
in constitutional interpretation—not to advocate localism or deference to local
government—but as evidence in constitutional interpretation. Using local
evidence in constitutional law is particularly important at a time in which
empirical research on county-level data is providing a wealth of information
that can better inform constitutional law.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court frequently relies on state law when interpreting
the U.S. Constitution.1 When doing so, the Justices take look to state law for
a range of purposes: counting the number of states adopting a type of law to
assess “national consensus”; 2 interpretation to minimize disruption of
existing state practice; 3 enforcing the constitution against outlier states; 4
generally asking whether a constitutional rule raises federalism concerns;
and asking whether an interpretation of the constitution comports with
traditional notions of due process or “fundamental” rights. Less understood
is the degree and manner in which the Court and other federal courts look
not just to state law, but to local law. In this Article, I argue that local law
and practice provides important evidence in constitutional interpretation.
When should local evidence matter for constitutional purposes? That
is the subject of this Article. Counties and cities are not sovereigns in the
same way that states are. For some purposes, federal courts treat local law
as just a subset of state law. However, just as state practices can matter
when assessing constitutional questions, so can local practices,
notwithstanding local governments’ lack of independent sovereignty. Courts
sometimes seek, for example, to interpret constitutional provisions so as to
minimize disruption of local practices. Courts sometimes take into account
whether local government practices are outlying or common.
Courts
sometimes assess local rules or practices to develop new norms. I do not
argue here for a version of localism—that the local deserves interpretation—I
do argue that local government can and should matter more in constitutional
interpretation—at a time in which empirical research on local-level data is
providing a wealth of information that can inform the law. 5
Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 U.C.L.A. L. R EV .
365 (2009); Note, State Law as “Other Law”: Our Fifty Sovereigns in the Federal
Constitutional Canon, 120 H ARV . L. R EV . 1670 (2007).
2 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 562-64 (2005).
3 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (noting that “a number of states”
had laws with exceptions for the type of peyote use at issue).
4 See Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 V A .
L. R EV .1, 6 (1996).
5 See, e.g. Brandon L. Garrett, Alexander Jakubow, and Ankur Desai, The American Death
Penalty Decline, 105 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 561 (2017) (analyzing twenty-five years of
death sentencing data at local level and describing relevance for constitutional doctrine). I do not
argue local practices necessarily deserve deference or constitutional rules should necessarily
be “tailored” to accommodate local practices, but rather that local practices and rules should
matter as important evidence in constitutional interpretation. See also Part III, infra. For
prominent arguments that local constitutional norms deserve deference, see, e.g. David
Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. P A . L. R EV .
487, 561-63 (1999); Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of Same1
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One area in which the Supreme Court has prominently suggested that
“counting counties” may be a useful exercise is in the Eighth Amendment
context. In 2015, Justice Stephen Breyer raised the issue directly in his
dissent in the case of Glossip v. Gross:
Geography also plays an important role in determining who is
sentenced to death…. Between 2004 and 2009, for example, just 29
counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for
approximately half of all death sentences imposed nationwide.6
Justice Breyer then discussed a growing body of empirical research
examining the changing local geography of the death penalty and called for
full briefing on the question whether the death penalty is now a cruel and
unusual punishment, under the Eighth Amendment.7 Why focus on counties
as outliers and not states? Justice Breyer argued that focusing on local
government shows how “unusual” the death penalty has become, and how
arbitrary its imposition has become, citing to empirical studies examining
local factors such as the preferences of local prosecutors, adequacy of local
defense resources, and racial distribution within counties.8 Justice Breyer
has repeated those concerns in a recent dissent from denial of certiorari.9
This analysis powerfully demonstrates how local government practices
can matter as evidence in constitutional reasoning.
In the Eighth
Amendment context, in which the focus for many decades has been on the
“evolving standards of decency” in our country, the Supreme Court has at
times insisted that the “clearest and most reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's
legislatures.” 10 Such judicial assessment of “national consensus” and
Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & Pol. 147 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the
Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 H ARV . L. R EV . 1810 (2004); Mark D. Rosen,
The Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Constitutional Principles, 153 U. P A . L. R EV .
1513, 1636 (2005); Joseph Blocher, Firearm Localism, 123 Y ALE L. J. 82, 85 (2013).
6 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S.Ct. 2726, 2761 (2015) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
7 Id. at 2761-62.
8 Id. at 2762 (citing studies finding that county disparities may be due to “the power of the
local prosecutor,” as well as “the availability of resources for defense counsel” and “the racial
composition of and distribution within a county”).
9 Sireci v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 470 (2016) (J. Breyer, dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The
number of yearly executions has fallen from its peak of 98 in 1999 to 19 so far this year,
while the average period of imprisonment between death sentence and execution has risen
from 12 years to over 18 years in that same period.”) (citing Death Penalty Information
Center
(DPIC),
Facts
about
the
Death
Penalty,
at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (updated Dec. 7, 2016); Dept. of
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, T. Snell, Capital Punishment, 2013—Statistical Tables,
p. 14 (rev. Dec. 19, 2014) (Table 10); DPIC Execution List 2016, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/execution-list-2016.”)).
10 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370
(1989) (“‘[F]irst’ among the “‘objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a given
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“evolving standards of decency,” has its critics, who argue that state law is
not the place to look; death sentencing is linked to the preferences of local
prosecutors, jurors, and judges. 11 In part for that reason, scholars have
assembled a large body of empirical research examining local-level death
sentencing practices.12 That data can inform doctrine, whether one agrees
with Justice Breyer’s assessment of the modern death penalty or not.
In general, relying on state law when interpreting the federal
constitution may not always be the most appropriate way to capture the
question whether a federal constitutional rule would unduly inhibit state
action. It is a far more settled practice to examine state law when
interpreting constitutional rights than to examine local law. 13 However,
critics have long been concerned that nose-counting of state laws can be a
strained or artificial exercise, 14 and that doing so undervalues federal
constitutional norms, and it can conversely overvalue state government
norms that do not fit federal constitutional values well.15
There is not just one way in which the Supreme Court and federal
courts rely on patterns in state law. Perhaps most noteworthy was its
departure from rote head-counting in Atkins v. Virginia, where the majority
emphasized: “It is not so much the number of these States that is significant,
but the consistency of the direction of change.”16 Sometimes a more forgiving
minority practice is selected because it is seen as less disruptive as a
constitutional floor than the approach adopted by the majority of states.
Justice Harlan famously defended such rulings as “born of the need to cope
sanction”’ are statutes passed by society's elected representatives.” It is also telling that both
of those rulings were later reversed when state legislation changed. Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
11 See Lain, supra, at n.7-8 (citing critics); Robert J. Smith, Bidish J. Sarma, Sophie Cull, The
Way the Court Gauges Consensus, 35 C ARDOZO L. R EV . 2397 (2014); Susan Raeker-Jordan,
Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: “Still in Search of A Unifying Principle”?, 73
U. P ITT . L. R EV . 107 (2011).
12 See Garrett, Jakubow, & Desai, supra note 5; see also Brandon L. Garrett, End of its Rope:
How Killing the Death Penalty can Revive Criminal Justice (Harvard University Press, 2017)
(presenting statistical analysis of death sentencing from 1990 to 2015); Lee Kovarsky, Muscle
Memory and the Local Concentration of Capital Punishment, 66 D UKE L. J. 259 (2016)
(examining county-level concentration of death sentences).
13 Akhil Reed Amar, America's Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and Principles We
Live By 112 (Basic Books 2012); Michael J. Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights 453
(Oxford 2004); Jeffrey Rosen, The Most Democratic Branch: How the Courts Serve America 4
(Oxford 2006).
14 For critics, see Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using
State Legislation as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. R EV . 1089,
1091-93, 1106 (2006). For defenses, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 H ARV . J.
L & P UB . P OL ’Y
17 (2009); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State
Constitutionalism, 106 H ARV . L. R EV . 1147 (1993); Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The
Law of Other States, 59 S TAN . L. R EV . 131, 142-46 (2006).
15 Wayne A. Logan, Creating a “Hydra in Government”: Federal Recourse to State Law in
Crime Fighting, 86 B.U. L. R EV . 65, 89 (2006).
16 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 315 (2002).
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with national diversity under the constraints of the incorporation doctrine.”17
For that reason, the Court at times ratifies the practice of a minority of
states. In other instances, as David Strauss describes, the Court adopts a
“modernizing” rule, to strike down infrequently enforced and outdated law.18
While sometimes taking account of state law, in other situations,
Supreme Court Justices have raised concerns as to competence of federal
judges to assess state law. “The process of examining state law is
unsatisfactory because it requires us to interpret state laws with which we
are generally unfamiliar,” as the majority put it in Michigan v. Long. 19
Consistency is another reason why judges may fear considering the content of
state law. Deference to “the vagaries of state criminal law,” for example, can
result in a “crazy quilt” rather than “uniform law of the land.”20
As I will describe in Part II of this Article, there are important
examples of robust use of local evidence in constitutional law. I classify four
types of use of local evidence in constitutional law, in which courts: (1)
examine patterns of local law and practice, including in criminal procedure
cases, and most prominently in the death penalty area; (2) examine best
practices at the local level to influence the appropriate constitutional floor,
including in the Fourth Amendment area; (3) examine county-level
enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is rarely enforced
at the local level; (4) use local remedies and needs to inform constitutional
norm-development, including in the Fourteenth Amendment cases. In Part
II, I explore examples of each.
Indeed, I will argue that the concern with judicial ability to assess local
practices has been honored largely in the breach. To provide one high profile
example, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore, heavily emphasized the
inconsistencies in practices for conducting the Presidential vote recount from
county to county, and also among recount teams within single counties. 21
The ruling has been strongly criticized and its precedential value is unclear
from the text of the ruling itself.22 However, the concern with arbitrary and
discriminatory practice and patterns is far from unique to the election law

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 136 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. C HI. L. R EV . 859,
878-79 (2009).
19 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039 (1983).
20 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 n.9 (2008); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S.
163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
21 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106.
22 Markenzy Lapointe, Bush v. Gore: Equal Protection Turned on its Head, Perhaps for a
Good Though Unintended Reason, 2 WYO. L. REV. 435, 479 (2002); David Cole, The Liberal
Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1427, 1452-74 (2006). The Court stated that its
ruling was “limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in
election processes generally presents many complexities. 531 U.S. at 109. See also see
generally Chad Flanders, Please Don’t Cite this Case!: The Precedential Value of Bush v.
Gore, 116 Y ALE L.J. P OCKET P ART 141 (2006).
17
18
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context. 23 Indeed, looking at law and practices at the local level may
sometimes answer objections to relying on state-level law or practice. States
may not be the most accurate signals of state legal practice in situations
when decisionmaking is more focused at the local level.24
In Part III, I turn to the methodological issues raised by using local
evidence in constitutional interpretation. The decision whether to defer to
local practices or not should itself be evidence-based. For example, the
frequent lack of good data about county practices can be a real obstacle to
using such evidence to inform constitutional interpretation. Judicial reliance
on local law and practice should not be, and sometimes has been, quite
anecdotal and ill-informed. This Article describes burgeoning research
examining county-level data and assesses the state of that research and the
areas in which further data is needed. Ultimately, in this Article, I set out an
empirical research and a constitutional law agenda for better use of local
evidence in constitutional interpretation.

I. DISAGGREGATING THE STATES
Examination of state law is pervasive in constitutional law, despite
concerns raised concerning the competence of federal judges to assess state
law and the relevance of state law to federal constitutional interpretation
questions. Many of the most significant Supreme Court rulings interpreting
the U.S. Constitution do so while citing evidence from state law. Often the
Justices include in their analysis some discussion of the numbers of states
adopting law consistent or inconsistent with the advanced constitutional
interpretation. Some of the reasons for examining state law have to do with
the states as sovereigns, and therefore the reasoning would not support
similarly examining the content of local law. However, when one examines
that analysis more closely, many of the reasons for focusing solely on statelevel lawmaking are not sovereignty-related, and as sovereignty-based
reasons start to erode, the case for a sharp distinction between the
treatments of state and local practices weakens. This Part begins with an
overview of the uses of state law in constitutional interpretation and then it
turns to the normative rationales for that usage, before turning to the sources
for law at the local level.
For a Note arguing that Bush v. Gore should inform analysis of the constitutionality of the
death penalty, see Andrew Ditchfield, Challenging the Intrastate Disparities in the
Application of Capital Punishment Statutes, 95 G EO . L.J. 801 (2007).
24 There is another advantage of relying on local government that I develop in Part III:
unlike state governments which have sovereign immunity and cannot be sued for damages
for violating the constitutional rights of individuals, local governments are liable, and could
therefore be more accountable and likely to adhere to constitutional norms.
23
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A. Uses of State Law in Constitutional Interpretation
The Supreme Court has looked to state law in a number of different
ways and using a range of different methods. There are a series of important
questions to ask about when and whether state law should be used, and none
of these questions have answers that are consistent across areas of Supreme
Court doctrine. These questions include:
What type of consensus matters?
State law may or may not be a useful measure depending on what type
of consensus matters for constitutional purposes. The Eighth Amendment,
the Supreme Court has long held, “must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” 25
Whether state law is a good or bad marker for the standards of decency in
society is a difficult question.
When is current state law relevant and when is old state law relevant?
In Glucksberg v. Washington, the Court noted how few states
permitted assisted suicide in finding the asserted due process right as not
“fundamental.” 26 A “fundamental” right might demand quite a bit of
consensus, and perhaps over a long period of time, to obtain that status. In
other areas, the Court is more concerned with current practice and whether a
new constitutional interpretation or rule might disrupt it. In Fourth
Amendment cases, the Court may assess reasonableness of searches by
examining state legislation, regarding subjects as diverse as warrantless
arrests and state rules of evidence.27 In Sixth Amendment cases, the Court
has cited to state practices regarding size of juries, or whether factfinding is
by a judge or a jury. 28 In its Sixth Amendment ruling on state statutes
permitting judicial imposition of the death penalty, in Ring v. Arizona, the
Court noted how “the great majority of States responded to this Court's
Eighth Amendment decisions requiring the presence of aggravating
circumstances in capital cases by entrusting those determinations to the
jury.”29
What if the law in the states is in flux?

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
27 E.g. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 600 (1980); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
28 Ring v. Arizina, 536 U.S. 584, 607-8 (2002); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 98 (1970).
29 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 607-08 (2002).
25
26
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To take a prominent example, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme
Court noted that about half the states at that time criminalized homosexual
sodomy.30 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court overruled Bowers and found that
the Bowers court had wholly “overstated” the prior practice, by focusing on
which states had laws on the book, and not at how often such laws were
actually enforced.31 In the Eighth Amendment area, in which the Court is
focused on contemporary standards of decency, in recent cases, the Court has
examined not just a count of how many states have statutes on the books, but
the “direction” of movement among state legislatures to or from some type of
statute. The Court has also focused on subsets of states as relevant when
considering the degree of state law adoption of a type of measure. For
example, the Court has noted that there would be little need for states in
which, for example, no executions have been carried out in decades, to
reconsider their death penalty statutes, and therefore such statutes might
not “count” when taking the measure of the law in the states.32
What evidence should be cited of the existence or usage of state law?
In the substantive due process context and in equal protection cases,
the Supreme Court has similarly focused on how many states have statutes
on the books, but sometimes the Court does more than “nosecount.” The
Justices sometimes also ask, as noted, whether those statutes are enforced,
and what are the numbers of sentences actually imposed under those
statutes (if they are criminal statutes). 33 The Justices have also asked
whether to count a state with a statute on the books, but which has been
found unconstitutional by the state supreme court.34 Timing can also matter.
The Justices have asked how recently adopted state statutes were, perhaps
treating statutes that have lingered on the books for a long time as a relic of
an earlier era, but more recent adoption as a sign that a type of statute
retains popularity.
What level of state law adoption matters?
The underlying constitutional right at issue may demand more or less
strength of state evidence. In the Eighth Amendment cases concerning the
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986).
539 U.S. at 571.
32 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
33 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73 (2003); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 n.5
(1967); Enmund v. Virginia, 458 U.S. 782, 796 (1982) (noting that there were only three
individuals on death row in the U.S. in the relevant category of non-direct participant felony
murderers).
34 See Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 423-25 (not counting Florida where although the state death
penalty statute includes child rape as death eligible, “where the Supreme Court of Florida
held the death penalty for child sexual assault to be unconstitutional.”)
30
31
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death penalty, for example, the Supreme Court refers to “national consensus”
as the standard. That standard can call for very strong evidence of state law
and practice. However, the Justices have disputed whether that consists in a
majority of the states, or a majority of the relevant death penalty states, or
something far more demanding than that. For example, in Kennedy v.
Louisiana, the Court emphasized: “44 States have not made child rape a
capital offense.”35 Yet that was an overstatement in the sense that many of
those were not states that any longer retained the death penalty for any
criminal offenses. In Graham v. Florida, the Court identified thirteen states
banned life without parole for at least some juvenile offenses, but the Court
found that the practice nevertheless violated the Eighth Amendment. 36
Strict nose-counting clearly is not the only explanation of those outcomes.
As the Sections that follow will discuss, these same questions are
important when the courts look to local practices when interpreting the
Constitution. However, these questions have not been asked or answered as
openly or with as much attention to methodological concerns.
B. Norms and Nose-counting
What are the purposes of assessing state law during constitutional
interpretation? In some areas, such as the Eighth Amendment cases
concerning whether punishment is cruel and unusual, the doctrine itself asks
about the existence of “national consensus” on an issue, and it therefore calls
for some assessment of state law. 37 In Glucksberg, the Court asked how
many states permitted assisted suicide when asking whether a candidate for
substantive due process protection was a “fundamental” right.38 State law
was evidence of how lawmakers treated the right.
In other areas, though, the doctrine does not as clearly call for such an
assessment, and the courts find it valuable for other reasons. One reason
courts may look to state law is to assess not whether state law already
recognizes a right and therefore federal law should follow, but to assess what
degree of disruption would result if a new federal right or interpretation of
the constitution is adopted. In other contexts, judges may defer to state
practices because they believe that state judges or lawmakers may have more
expertise in an area and may be more likely to have the correct answers.
Justice Sotomayor in Kansas v. Carr emphasized this function of federalismbased deference in a ruling regarding a Kansas procedure in death penalty

554 U.S. at 423.
560 U.S. 48, 62 (2010).
37 554 U.S. at 423.
38 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
35
36
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trials. 39 Justice Sotomayor explained: “[The role of state courts as
innovators] is particularly important in the criminal arena because state
courts preside over many millions more criminal cases than their federal
counterparts and so are more likely to identify protections important to a fair
trial.”40 Similarly, Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein have argued that broadly
held interpretations or views may not only deserve deference, but they may
be more likely to be correct. 41 The states may be laboratories for
experimentation that over time reach sound or even correct answers.
One might assume that a useful component of federalism would
involve some deference to state lawmaking, including by asking whether
some type of state law is a common one, for which a constitutional challenge
might disrupt accepted state practice. However, even from the perspective of
federalism, some have criticized the use of information about state law in
constitutional interpretation. One source of criticism relates to what was
discussed above: that it is hard to decide in any objective fashion what counts
as sufficient consensus among the states.42 Others more broadly argue that
state constitutionalism should be robust and is an important source for
informed law. 43 These debates, even if they have not been resolved and
involve deeper questions about the role of evidence and federalism in
constitutional interpretation, are far more developed than debates about the
role of evidence and localism in constitutional interpretation.
C. Counting Localities
There are more than 39,000 localities in the United States, with over
19,000 municipal governments, over 16,500 townships, and over 3,000
counties, according to the most recent U.S. Census Bureau data. 44 When
referring broadly to localities or counties in this Article, I include other types
of local administrative units, particularly incorporated municipalities or
Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. 633, 647–48 (2016) (“We intervene in an intrastate dispute
between the State's executive and its judiciary rather than entrusting the State's structure of
government to sort it out... And we lose valuable data about the best methods of protecting
constitutional rights—a particular concern in cases like these, where the federal
constitutional question turns on the ‘reasonable likelihood’ of jury confusion, an empirical
question best answered with evidence from many state courts.”).
40 Kansas v. Carr, 136 S. Ct. at 648.
41 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 S TAN . L. R EV . 131, 142-46
(2006).
42 Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State Legislation
as Evidence of an Evolving National Consensus, 84 N.C. L. R EV . 1089, 1091-93, 1106 (2006).
43 For a defense see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 H ARV . J. L & P UB . P OL ’ Y 17
(2009). For a broader argument in favor of robust state constitutionalism, see Paul W. Kahn,
Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 H ARV . L. R EV . 1147 (1993).
44 National League of Cities, Number of Municipal Governments and Population Distribution
(last visited January 11, 2018), at http://www.nlc.org/number-of-municipal-governmentspopulation-distribution.
39
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cities, as well as parishes, districts, and other types of units. One criticism of
a legal focus on federal law and particularly constitutional law is that it
ignores how central local government units are to the day-to-day lives of
residents.45 Local government can inform state law and state constitutional
law, although to varying degrees depending on the structure of lawmaking in
any given state and the practical reality of state politics.46
That said, local government does not have the same sovereign status
as state government. As the Supreme Court has often stated: “States
traditionally have been accorded the widest latitude in ordering their
internal governmental processes.”47 Local government entities are “political
subdivisions such as cities and counties are created by the State,” and they
exist “as convenient agencies for exercising such of the government powers as
may be entrusted to them.”48 Constitutional provisions do limit the power
and authority of the state over local entities. For example, equal protection
and voting rights may not be infringed upon. However, the background
presumption is that local entities are creatures of state law. For that reason,
the Court has often emphasized state law sources as more authoritative and
permanent. The Supreme Court has also sometimes suggested that local
government is less to be trusted in matters of constitutional interpretation.
As the Court put it, “small and local authority may feel less sense of
responsibility to the Constitution, and agencies of publicity may be less
vigilant in calling it to account.”49 If so, as I develop, looking at whether local
practices are atypical should matter in the analysis, and similarly, that local
practices are common and representative should matter in the analysis. The
decision whether to defer to local practices or not should be evidence-based.
D. Localism without Evidence
Despite the contingent status of local government entities, in a series
of cases, Supreme Court Justices have emphasized the importance of local
autonomy in constitutional interpretation. There is a large literature on
localism and the degree to which the Court emphasizes it, and localism is not
my subject in this Article. What is important to note, however, is that
typically in opinions that do describe a need to defer to local government
decisions, the Court does not solicit or attempt to measure the views of local

See Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to
Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 Y ALE L. & P UB . P OL ’Y Rev.187, 218 (1996) (“the
Court’s decisions have recognized the key role of localities without explicitly saying so.”)
46 Daniel B. Rodriguez, Localism and Lawmaking, 32 R UTGERS L.J. 627 (2001).
47 Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 475 (1982).
48 Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 71 (1978); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161,
178 (1907).
49 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943).
45
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government, necessarily, but nevertheless interprets the constitution to defer
to local interests.50
Such rulings, deferring to the local in a largely uncritical fashion, are
exactly what I would argue that the Supreme Court and federal courts should
not be doing. When turning from the national to the local, sometimes the
Court has emphasized that a diversity of local practices is unproblematic or
should be embraced. For example, the Supreme Court ruled in Missouri v.
Lewis that “[i]f diversities of laws . . . may exist in the several States without
violating the equality clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no solid
reason why there may not be such diversities in different parts of the same
State.”51 The Court has approved funding laws that provide very different
resource levels to public schools, based on county districting. 52 Instead, I
would argue, the Court should conduct a careful examination of that
variation in resource levels and assess whether it is non-arbitrary or not.
In other areas, the Supreme Court has avoided discussing the local
government implications or bases for its rulings, and such rulings also raise
the concern that local evidence is not even being considered. Scholars have
argued that the Court discusses the local when it is convenient and ignores
the local when it is not convenient; Joan Williams has called this a type of
“forum-shifting,” not by litigants, but by “shifting power among different
levels of government.”53 Professor Richard Schragger has argued that local
government is an important but neglected constitutional actor in the
Establishment Clause context where “much of Religion Clause doctrine has
been forged in conflicts that directly implicate the traditional powers of local
government.”54 Schragger criticizes the Supreme Court for not distinguishing
between national and local regulation of religion, and that doing so can invite
more damaging centralized regulation, as opposed to local municipal power.55
Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 W IS . L. R EV . 83, 84 (1986) (“Given that the
fourteenth amendment allows courts to limit state sovereignty in order to vindicate federal
constitutional rights, why should the sovereignty of localities, which are mere subdivisions of
states, limit the reach of the fourteenth amendment when states' sovereignty cannot?”).
51 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879). See also Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1887). See also
Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (“While such regulations are subject to
judicial scrutiny upon fundamental grounds, yet a considerable latitude of discretion must be
accorded to the lawmaking power; and so long as the regulation in question is not shown to
be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary, and operates uniformly upon all persons similarly
situated in the particular district, the district itself not appearing to have been arbitrarily
selected, it cannot be judicially declared that there is a deprivation of property without due
process of law, or a denial of the equal protection of the laws, within the meaning of the 14th
Amendment.”).
52 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54-55 (1973).
53 Williams, supra note 49, at 87-88.
54 Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious
Liberty, 117 H ARV . L. R EV . 1810 (2004).
55 Id. at 1818.
50
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The local preferences of counties and cities do seem to matter more,
and receive more explicit acknowledgment by the Supreme Court, in areas
that are seen as traditionally subject to such local regulation. Justice
William J. Brennan famously asked in San Diego Gas & Electric v. City of
San Diego, “‘If a policeman must know the Constitution, why not a
planner?” 56 The Supreme Court’s rulings regarding zoning decisions and
land use matters adopted a highly deferential standard, making it
unnecessary to engage much with the content of local law; the idea was to
defer to local preferences.57
Then again, the Court’s direction is not fully consistent in the land use
and takings area either. More recent rulings have adopted less deferential
standards in rulings concerning the Takings Clause and so-called regulatory
takings in which local land use regulations affect property.58 Such rulings
may reflect an abiding concern with localism: that the local does not deserve
deference if localities are abusing the rights of individuals or of groups. In
dissent in the 2013 ruling in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District, Justice Elena Kagan expressed the concern that the Court by
relaxing its traditional deference “threaten[] to subject a vast array of landuse regulations, applied daily in States and localities throughout the country,
to heightened constitutional scrutiny.”59
My focus is not on when localism should matter, but that the question
whether and how to defer to the local should be, in my view, informed by
empirical evidence. As described in this part, there is a literature and a
practice of relying on state evidence when considering the role of federalism
in constitutional interpretation. The relevance of evidence in considering the
role of localism raises different questions. If deference risks constitutional
rights violations in the view of the majority, then it is understandable that
such deference would be restrained, but more must be known about the
variation and content and the effects of local government policies. In the next
Part, I turn to a series of concrete examples in which local evidence is
considered in constitutional law, at varying levels of sophistication and for
several different purposes.
II. EXAMPLES OF LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The use of local evidence in constitutional law is in fact a robust part of
constitutional practice, if not theory. In this Part, I turn to areas in which
constitutional law is to some degree already informed by local law and
450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
58 Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
59 Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (2013) (Kagan, J.
dissenting).
56
57
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practice. Sometimes local sources inform the courts. At other times, to be
sure, they do not. Indeed, the Supreme Court has sometimes expressed
skepticism at the value of examining local practices at all. The result of that
analysis can suggest a “crazy quilt” of local practices that are not suited to
inform the “uniform law of the land.”60 Nevertheless, before deciding what
the uniform rule should be, even if it is just a constitutional floor, it is
important, I argue, to understand what the local practices are, whether they
are uniform or a “crazy quilt,” and what that means for the rule one might
adopt at the federal level.
In this Part, I make the case that looking to local government is not
only possible and sometimes done, but it can significantly advance
constitutional analysis and interpretation. It can make constitutional law
better. In Part III, I will then turn towards a more principled and
empirically informed approach towards relying on local government evidence,
which is so lacking in the Supreme Court’s largely inconsistent approach
towards the problem.
In this Part, I classify four types of use of local evidence in
constitutional law, in which courts: (1) examine patterns of local law and
practice, most prominently in the death penalty area; (2) examine best
practices at the local level to influence the appropriate constitutional floor,
including in the Fourth Amendment area; (3) examine county-level
enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is rarely enforced
at the local level; (4) use local remedies and needs to inform constitutional
norm-development, including in the Fourteenth Amendment cases.
Before turning to examples of each of those four types, I note as a
preliminary matter that local governments cannot invoke the U.S.
Constitution as against states under the rule of Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh. 61 That rule ensures local government actors are not, directly,
constitutional actors as against states. However, local government actors are
nevertheless crucial constitutional litigants. Local government can be sued
and held civilly accountable for federal constitutional violations by its
officials, without the benefit of state sovereign immunity, under the Supreme
Court’s doctrine in Monell v. Department of Social Services.62 As a result of
Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2584 n.9 (2008); Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S.
163, 185 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring).
61 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907). For an insightful critical analysis of the doctrine, see Kathleen
S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 H ARV . C.R.-C.L. L. R EV . 1
(2012); see also David J. Barron, Why (and When) Cities Have a Stake in Enforcing the
Constitution, 115 Y ALE L.J. 2218, 2232 (2006); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding,
57 Stan. L. Rev. 1745 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, Reclaiming the Canvassing Board: Bush
v. Gore and the Political Currency of Local Government, 50 B UFF . L. R EV . 393, 395-96, 40709 (2002). See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 344-45 (1960) (“Legislative control
of municipalities, no less than other state power, lies within the scope of relevant limitations
imposed by the United States Constitution.”)
62 Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
60

13

LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
that doctrine interpreting the central civil rights statute, cities and counties
are common defendants in constitutional litigation. A range of constitutional
doctrines developed by taking interests of local government into account
because local government is the litigant. Several such doctrines are
developed in this Part.
Local evidence can also inform constitutional law; that is the subject of
this Part. Should local laws, policies, or legal practices matter when
conducting constitutional interpretation? There are any number of
constitutional rulings that happen to involve challenges to municipal
ordinances or local government actors that do not dwell on the subject. If
local government should matter, how should it matter? After all, some
answers to the questions posed about the use of state law in constitutional
cases would come out differently if the court was focused instead upon
counties as the relevant unit of inquiry. For some questions, state law may
seem distant from the locus of local decisionmaking. Counties may be
particularly important areas for focus in matters in which law and
policymaking is itself focused at the local level. For example, criminal law,
land use, and even areas often seen as federal, like immigration enforcement,
are all heavily impacted by local level decisions.63 As I will describe in this
Part, a careful analysis of local practices can improve decisionmaking and
add valuable information to constitutional interpretation and analysis.
A. Constitutional Criminal Procedure
In general, criminal justice is highly localized in the United States: it
is a fragmented system. Although state law defines criminal offenses and
sentences, with states running prisons, 64 the larger work of arresting
offenders, charging them, convicting them, and supervising them postconviction, falls to counties. The trial courts, prosecutor’s offices, police
agencies, defense offices, are all usually governed almost entirely locally.
County priorities and policies matter enormously, as to style of policing,
charging decisions by prosecutors, resources for defense lawyers, and
approaches adopted by judges. For those reasons, constitutional criminal
procedure is a particularly ripe area for careful consideration of the local in

On immigration enforcement and wide variation in local practice as between different
large urban counties, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of
Variation in Local Enforcement, 88 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 1126 (2013) (“American criminal justice
plays out at the local level. At the same time, federal immigration enforcement increasingly
takes place in partnership with local police, prosecutors, jailers, and probation officers. The
consequences of this new dynamic are surprisingly understudied.”); see also David Alan
Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 N EW C RIM . L. R EV . 157,
202 (2012).
64 For a critique of this tendency, see W. David Ball, Why State Prisons? 33 Y ALE L. P OL ’ Y
R EV . 75 (2014).
63
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interpretation. As the sections that follow will describe, several areas are
important examples of use of local evidence in constitutional interpretation.
1. Local Enforcement Patterns and the Eighth Amendment
The death penalty is an area subject to a complex body of
constitutional regulation under the Eighth Amendment, in particular. One
reason why the death penalty is an area that can particularly benefit from
local constitutional interpretation is that in its decades-long modern
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has increasingly looked not just to statelevel practices but also local practices. These cases provide an example of the
first type of use of local evidence that I set out in this Part: examining
patterns of local law and practice in criminal procedure cases.
In the past, as noted, the Supreme Court looked to states and not
localities. The Justices had highlighted for Eighth Amendment purposes how
“first among the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a
given sanction are statutes passed by society’s elected representatives.” 65
Rulings therefore asked how many states adopted death penalty statutes of a
given type to assess what contemporary attitudes are towards them. The
Supreme Court’s concern that the death penalty may be imposed arbitrarily
in a manner that “smacks of little more than a lottery system”66 or that is “so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed”67 dates back to its ruling in Furman v.
Georgia, finding the death penalty unconstitutional in 1972, only to reverse
course in Gregg v. Georgia and companion cases in 1976, having been assured
that new more detailed state-level statutes would make death sentences more
predictable and informed. 68 Focusing on state death penalty statutes,
Supreme Court had not often cited to county-level death sentencing practices
in its Eighth Amendment cases.
However, this largely state-level focus has changed over time. The
Court has increasingly cited to the practices of sentencing juries and charging
practices by prosecutors as relevant in addition to state-level statutes. Thus,
dissenting in Roper v. Simmons, Justice Antonin Scalia noted: “[W]e have, in
our determination of society's moral standards, consulted the practices of
sentencing juries: Juries maintain a link between contemporary community
values and the penal system that this Court cannot claim for itself.”69 The
concern with the practical reality of jury decisionmaking dates back to the
Furman v. Georgia ruling itself. Justice Thurgood Marshall, in his opinion,
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
408 U.S. 238, 293 (1972) (Brennan, J. concurring).
67 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J. concurring).
68 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (stating that “the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty
of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and
guidance.”).
69 543 U.S. 551, 616 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65
66
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emphasized that state statutes are not a sufficient guide to current death
penalty practices: “Legislative ‘policy’ is thus necessarily defined not by what
is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising the
discretion so regularly conferred upon them.”70 In other rulings, the Justices
have more strongly emphasized presence or absence of state statutes as the
best evidence for current death penalty practices.
The Eighth Amendment relevance of counties is changing, as the
increasingly fine-grained data about death sentencing practices makes its
way into the courts. As noted in the Introduction, in a dissent in 2015,
Justice Breyer raised the issue directly in Glossip v. Gross, writing:
Geography also plays an important role in determining who is
sentenced to death…. Between 2004 and 2009, for example, just 29
counties (fewer than 1% of counties in the country) accounted for
approximately half of all death sentences imposed nationwide.
Justice Breyer added that where, “The Eighth Amendment forbids
punishments that are cruel and unusual. Perhaps more importantly, in the
last two decades, the imposition and implementation of the death penalty
have increasingly become unusual.” Justice Breyer called for full briefing on
the question whether the death penalty is now cruel and unusual, under the
Eighth Amendment, and when that briefing occurs, “data-driven
arbitrariness review” may take on a more prominent role, with the
availability of detailed county-level data on death sentencing.71
Not only is the doctrine amenable to local-level analysis, but there is a
growing body of empirical data available to inform the doctrine. In recent
years, just a few dozen counties have accounted for the bulk of death
sentences imposed nationwide. Scholars have conducted detailed research
collecting data on the use of the death penalty at the county level; the data
was not available before they began to do so, as the federal government only
reports state-level data on death sentencing. The first study to do so
comprehensively, the landmark “Broken System” study led by Professor
James Liebman, Valerie West, and Jeffrey Fagan examined death sentences
from 1977 through 1995, and found a concentration of death sentences in a
small minority of counties. 72 The researchers noted, “Even in Texas, nearly
60% of its counties did not impose a single death sentence in the period.”73 A

408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring).
Smith, supra note xxx, at 254. Professor Smith also called for collection more detailed
charging data regarding potentially capital cases in order to better examine what factors
influenced county-level processing and outcomes in death-eligible cases. Id. at 256.
72 James Liebman & P. Clarke, Minority Practice, Majority’s Burden: The Death Penalty
Today, 9 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 255, 312 (2012).
73 Id. at 264. Further, data analysis of appellate and post-conviction reversals showed that
state courts were more likely to overturn death sentences from urban than rural and small70
71
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more recent report analyzing executions in 1976, including from data
collected by Professor Frank Baumgartner, found that only 2% of counties in
the U.S. were responsible for a majority of the cases, and 85% of the counties
in the U.S. had not had a single execution in over 45 years.74
A study by Professor Robert J. Smith of recent death sentences
between 2004 and 2009 found even greater concentration, as death sentences
have declined in number, noting that: “The geographic distribution of death
sentences reveals a clustering around a narrow band of counties: roughly 1%
of counties in the United States returned death sentences at a rate of one or
more sentences per year from 2004 to 2009.” 75 Thus, Smith noted, Los
Angeles County, California sentenced more people to death in 2009 as the
entire state of Texas, and Maricopa County, Arizona sentenced more than the
entire state of Alabama.76 Crossing county lines can make a huge difference;
for example, the chances of being sentenced to death in Baltimore County
were 13 times higher than in Baltimore City, when Maryland had the death
penalty.77 In Texas, Harris County accounts for the vast bulk of the states
death row, far out of proportion to its population or to the numbers of
murders occurring in the County.78 A “small set of counties” are imposing
death sentences, and this means that “it is the practices, policies, habits and
political milieu of local prosecutors, jurors and judges that dictate whether a
given defendant in the United States—whatever his crime—will be charged,
tried, convicted and sentenced capitally and executed.” 79 What explains
which counties are the most prone to impose death sentences?
Brandon Garrett, Alexander Jakubow and Ankur Desai recently
conducted research analyzing the entire period of modern death sentencing,
collecting data at the county-level on death sentencing from 1990 through
present. That data is described in an empirical article and in a recent book,
titled, “End of its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can Revive Crimnal
Justice.”80 The researchers describe a dramatic decline in death sentencing,
town jurisdictions. Andrew Gelman et al., A Broken System: The Persistent Pattern of
Reversals of Death Sentences in the United States, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 209, 247 (2004).
74 Frank R. Baumgartner, The North Carolina Database of U.S. Executions, U. N.C. Chapel
Hill,
Departmentt
Pol.
Sci.,
available
at
http://www.unc.edu/~
fbaum/Innocence/executions.htm; Richard C. Dieter, The 2% Death Penalty: How a Minority
of Counties Produce Most Death Cases at Enormous Costs to All, Death Penalty Information
Center (October 2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/TwoPercentReport.pdf.
75 Robert J. Smith, The Geography of the Death Penalty and Its Ramifications, 92 B.U. L.
Rev. 227, 228 (2012).
76 Id. at 233.
77 Raymond Paternoster et al., An Empirical Analysis Of Maryland’s Death Sentencing
System With Respect To The Influence Of Race And Legal Jurisdiction 30-31 (2003).
78 Dieter, supra, at 13-14.
79 Liebman, supra note xxx at 262 (reporting “from 1973 to 1995, sixty-six counties imposed
2569 of the 5131 total death sentences.”).
80 Garrett, Jakubow, Desai, supra note xxx, at 561; Brandon L. Garrett, End of its Rope: How
Killing the Death Penalty can Revive Criminal Justice (Harvard University Press, 2017).

17

LOCAL EVIDENCE IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
where only thirty-nine people were sentenced to death in 2017 and only
thirty-one in 2016, record lows, as compared with over 300 sentenced to death
in the 1990s. Only twenty-eight counties sentenced people to death in 2016,
as compared with over two hundred counties per year in the 1990s. The
figure below displays the number of counties that imposed death sentences
from 1990 through 2016.81
Fig. 1. Number of Counties with Death Sentences, 1990-2016

In this empirical work, Garrett, Jakubow, and Desai describe how
death sentencing has almost entirely disappeared in rural America over the
space of fifteen years. In the past decade, death sentencing has become a
fixture in only a scattered group of larger, more populous and urban
counties.82 The figure below illustrations the growing population density
among the shrinking group of counties that impose death sentences. The
counties are also increasingly racially fragmented and have relatively larger
black populations.
Fig. 2. Demographic Trends by Sentencing Status83

81

Garrett, Jakubow & Desai, supra, at 125.
Garrett, Jakubow & Desai, supra, at Part II.A.
83 Id. at 131.
82
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Death sentencing occurs in counties with higher murder rates, but it is
counties with more white victims of murder that engage in more death
sentencing, while black homicide victimization is not correlated with death
sentencing. 84
Finally, counties that impose death sentences exhibit a
powerful inertia effect, where death sentencing is strongly associated with
prior county-level death sentencing.85
These results have implications for constitutional regulation of the
death penalty. They also raise the question whether the death penalty has
become arbitrary under the Eighth Amendment.86 To date, such arguments
have largely not been considered in the courts. To be sure, the Supreme
Court has considered and rejected empirical evidence concerning death
sentencing patterns before, and this raises the concern that even now that
more research has been done, that country-level patterns may not matter to
the Justices in the future. In its ruling in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Supreme
Court considered a state-specific study of Georgia death sentencing
patterns.87 The data showed a strong correlation between the race of the
victim and the likelihood that a defendant would be sentenced to death. The
Justices emphasized that this data was focused at the state level, and not the
county or the case in which the defendant had been sentenced.
In fact, in McCleskey, county-level data displayed the same race
disparity. The particular county, Fulton County, Georgia, in which Warren
McKleskey was prosecuted, had 32 death-eligible prosecutions, and a
defendant killing a white victim was 3.6 times more likely to get the death
penalty than if the victim was black. 88 The Justices, however were more
broadly skeptical of such empirical data, particularly where there is so much
discretion build into a range of decisionmakers, such as the prosecutor, the
judge, and the jurors, who make decisions whether to bring cases and
ultimately what sentence to impose. The Justices’ reasoning rejected the
relevance of empirics, and only modestly engaged with the reality of local
practice and dynamics when making sentencing decisions.
Does local evidence when used in constitutional interpretation more
faithfully apply the command of the Eighth Amendment? Perhaps the
modern empirical case provides a more powerful demonstration of
arbitrariness in death sentencing, based on county-level data and a steep
decline in the use of the death penalty. County lines are highly salient if not
completely determinative in practice.
Should they matter under the
Constitution? This is not an argument based on localism, or a notion that
84

Id., supra, at Part II.C.
Id., supra, at Part II.E.
86 Id. at Part III.D.
87 Such data was most prominently the subject of the Supreme Court’s ruling in McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287 (1987).
88 Baldus et al, 232, in Death Penalty Stories.
85
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localities deserve deference. Indeed, these data show that outlier localities do
not deserve deference because their practices are grossly out of line with that
of other localities, even in leading death sentencing states. These disparities
raise a constitutional concern under the Eighth Amendment that the
imposition of the death penalty has become far more “unusual” and arbitrary
than in the past. That outlier concern places the approach in the third
category of use of local evidence, where the patterns in local enforcement may
show that the state law is itself an outlier that is rarely used. This concern is
all the more severe when one looks at how few counties even within the most
seemingly staunch death penalty states that currently impose death
sentences. Whether Justices other than Justice Breyer will want to address
these concerns in future years is an open question.
2. Local Norm Development and the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment doctrine regulating the use of force by police,
including deadly force, is another area in which local constitutional
interpretation is ripe for reconsideration. This area is one in which courts
have sometimes, but not often, used the second category that I describe in
this Part: courts have examined best practices at the local level to influence
the appropriate constitutional floor. In deciding whether to recognize a due
process right, in criminal procedure cases, the Court typically does not
conduct a cost benefit analysis under Mathews v. Eldridge, but rather asks
whether it is a fundamental right that has been traditionally protected by
states. Sometimes, however, the Court also looks at local government rules,
not to assess their usage empirically, but rather to survey what is accepted
local practice. The Fourth Amendment is a surprising example, but the way
in which the Court has looked at local government practices has changed over
time in a way that provides a troubling object lesson.
One prominent example of local constitutional interpretation is
Tennessee v. Garner, a seminal case regarding the use of deadly force by
police officers under the Fourth Amendment, which prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Supreme Court noted that: “In evaluating the
reasonableness of police procedures under the Fourth Amendment, we have
also looked to prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions.”89 The case itself
involved a police officer shooting a non-dangerous fleeing felon, as permitted
under a state statute and the traditional common law rule. But the Court
carefully examined police department policies and did not simply rely on
state statutes. The Court noted that “[a majority of police departments in
this country have forbidden the use of deadly force against nonviolence
suspects.”90 The Court mentioned examples of police policies, including the
New York City Police Department and those of forty-four other law
89
90

471 U.S. 1 (1985).
Garner, 471 U.S. at 10-11.
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enforcement agencies. The Court also cited research on best practices by
police organizations such as International Association of Chiefs of Police and
the accreditation criteria of the Commission on Accreditation for Law
Enforcement Agencies.91 Thus, the Court used local practices to inform best
practices in the Fourth Amendment area, that themselves informed the
constitutional rule adopted.
The ruling in Garner was something of a high-water mark, though, in
the attention that the Supreme Court paid to local police practices. In the
decades since, the Justices have instead emphasized discretion of individual
officers, rather than police department-level practices and supervision. In
doing so, the Justices have disregarded evidence that a particular police
department’s policy or practices are outlier practices that are dangerous,
unwise, or unusual among professional police departments.
For example, in its ruling in Scott v. Harris, the Justices reviewed the
decision by an officer to end a high speed chase by running a vehicle off the
road, which resulted in severe injuries to the driver.92 The Justices did not
discuss best practices in any way, and suggested that what is right may
depend on what is reasonable in the circumstances. 93 The Justices never
engaged with, much less discussed, policing literature on the dangers of
permitting high speed chases at all, much less using ramming techniques to
end them in a potentially highly dangerous fashion. Only Justice Stevens in
dissent discussed alternative means for ending high speed chases.94
Had the Justices engaged with local practices, the opinion in Scott v.
Harris would have looked very different. The International Association of the
Chiefs of Police policy stated that: “Officers may not intentionally use their
vehicle to bump or ram the suspect’s vehicle in order to force the vehicle to a
stop off the road or in a ditch.”95 Moreover, as Seth Stoughton and I have
discussed, the record was replete with evidence of poor local policy,
supervision and training. 96 Many other recent Supreme Court rulings on
police use of force have done the same. The Justices’ ruling in Sheehan, like
that in Harris, entirely failed to engage with what well-trained officers
should do, and what the practices are in professional agencies, for engaging
with mentally ill individuals.97
There are many structural features of modern civil rights litigation
that draw attention away from questions of sound local government policy
and practice, than the manner in which the Justices interpret rights.
Litigation often focuses on the conduct of individual officers and not on local
Garner, 471 U.S. at 18-19.
550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007).
93 Id.
94 Harris, 550 U.S. at 396-97, 397 n.9.
95 Garrett and Stoughton, supra note xxx, at 235.
96 Id. at 234-36.
97 City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1777-78 (2015).
91
92
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government-level policy, supervision, and training.98 However, as cases like
Garner show, there is room in the doctrine to focus on what sound local police
practices are, and to use sound police practices to inform the constitutional
doctrine. The constitutional rule may be a floor, but it need not undermine
local government efforts run professional police departments.
B. Local Outliers and Substantive Due Process
In rulings concerning substantive due process rights regarding
marriage, procreation, family relationships, education, sexual orientation,
and other privacy and autonomy-related rights, the Supreme Court has
sometimes looked not just to state law but local practices and enforcement, to
get a broad sense whether a type of practice is an outlier practice. In that
context, the Court has typically not relied on detailed information concerning
local practices. However, local government practices have still played an
important role in the development of the doctrine. These cases provide an
example of the third category that I develop in this Part: courts examining
county-level enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is
rarely enforced at the local level.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, the Court upheld state anti-sodomy laws and
noted, using state head-counting that about half the states had criminalized
sodomy.99 In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court overruled Bowers, and found that
the Bowers court at “overstated” the prior practice, including by focusing on
state law and because since that ruling, states had moved away from
prohibiting same-sex conduct.100 The Court emphasized how rarely any of
those laws on the books were used; even at the time of Bowers, states like
Georgia “had not sought to enforce its law for decades.”101
What Justice Kennedy could have highlighted was that it was local
prosecutors who were declining to bring cases to enforce state laws; local
decisionmakers had made anti-sodomy statutes moribund. Justice Kennedy
wrote that: “In those States where sodomy is still proscribed, whether for
same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of nonenforcement with
respect to consenting adults acting in private.” 102 Again, that nonenforcement would primarily be at the local prosecution level. Justice
Kennedy added: “The State of Texas admitted in 1994 that as of that date it
had not prosecuted anyone under those circumstances.” 103 In Texas, that
non-enforcement would be based on decisions chiefly by elected district
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attorneys. In a concurring opinion, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor similarly
emphasized how rarely the law had been enforced.104
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Romer v. Evans was based on the
impact that a Colorado constitutional amendment had on disabling any local
laws from providing anti-discrimination protection based on homosexual,
lesbian, or bisexual “orientation, conduct, practices or relationships.”105 The
Court noted that some of the largest urban centers in Colorado, such as “the
cities of Aspen and Boulder and the city and County of Denver each
had enacted ordinances which banned discrimination in many transactions
and activities, including housing, employment, education, public
accommodations, and health and welfare services.” 106 The statewide
amendment was designed to strike down at those local anti-discrimination
laws. The Justices emphasized not just the general far-reaching effects of the
statutes, but they surveyed Colorado’s state but also municipal laws. The
majority noted such laws “follow a consistent pattern” in enumerating
persons or entities that may not discriminate and enumerating a range of
groups or persons that are protected, extending beyond the Supreme Court’s
caselaw on groups subject to strict scrutiny. 107 Thus, these statutes and
ordinances typically included an “extensive catalog of traits which cannot be
the basis for discrimination,” including sexual orientation. 108 The Court went
on to explain the unique disabilities imposed by the legislation, its breadth,
and why it violated rational basis scrutiny in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Romer opinion did somewhat more than the other substantive due
process rulings to analyze patterns in local government practices. However,
what is useful to highlight for these purposes is that the Justices conducted
this brief survey of local ordinances in Colorado and the content of that local
law mattered to the decisionmaking, while in other areas, the rarity of local
government enforcement mattered to the ultimate decision. In each of these
cases, local government practices constituted important evidence used to
support a constitutional decision.
C. Local Practices and the Fourteenth Amendment
Much of the body of law that established race discrimination in the
United States post-Reconstruction was enacted at the local level, in the form
of ordinances regulating public accommodations, education, employment, and
housing; they were supplemented by state laws and constitutional provisions
Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J.) (quoting See State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943
(Tex.1994) (noting that the provision “has not been, and in all probability will not be,
enforced against private consensual conduct between adults”)).
105 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996).
106 Id. at 623-24.
107 Id. at 628.
108 Id. at 628.
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but they enacted racial preferences and segregation locally. 109 Following
Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court remanded in Brown II the
question of developing remedies to district courts, due to their “proximity to
local conditions and the possible need for further hearings.”110 Over time, the
Supreme Court focused more on the unit of local government, in this case the
school district (which might or might not correspond with municipal or
county lines) and increasingly limited inter-district remedies.111 As a result,
the caselaw did not account for practices as between counties or patterns
across a state; the caselaw focused on practices within individual local
entities. In that way, the cases were a strong example of the fourth category
set out in this Part, in which the courts used local remedies and needs to
inform constitutional norm-development.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Bush v. Gore, finding that there was an
Equal Protection violation in conducting Florida recounts in the 2000
Presidential election, did emphasize patterns across counties. That ruling
emphasized the inconsistencies in practices for conducting the Presidential
vote recount from county to county, as well as among recount teams within
single counties. 112 The ruling has been strongly criticized, and the ruling
itself makes its precedential value quite unclear.113 As a result, it is hard to
say whether the Bush v. Gore decision sets out anything like a model for
looking more carefully at patterns and disparities in local practices. That
ruling, though, provides an example of category one, in which the court
examines patterns of local law and practice.
D. State Cases that are Local
One area in which local government matters, but only sub silentio, are
cases in which localities are not examined, but instead, the state interests
examined are in fact largely the work of local government decisionmakers.
The Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment commandeering cases provide an
example of this different phenomenon, where the constitutional problem is
Note, The Matter of Racial Differences and Local Police Legislation, 5 LOY.L.REV. 73
(1949).
110 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
111 For decisions affirming broad remedial powers, see Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189,
198-203 (1973) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1970);
for decisions limiting those powers, see, e.g. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974);
See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992). For an
overview, see James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, Money, 109 Yale L. J. 249, 283 (1999).
112 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 106.
113 Markenzy Lapointe, Bush v. Gore: Equal Protection Turned on its Head, Perhaps for a
Good Though Unintended Reason, 2 W YO . L. R EV . 435, 479 (2002); David Cole, The Liberal
Legacy of Bush v. Gore, 94 G EO . L.J. 1427, 1427, 1452-74 (2006). The Court stated that its
ruling was “limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in
election processes generally presents many complexities. 531 U.S. at 109. See also Flanders,
supra note xxx.
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characterized as about questions of state sovereignty, but where evidence
concerning the preferences and policies of distinctly local actors could have
played an important role had it been considered.
Take the case of Printz v. United States, striking down provisions of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act under the Tenth Amendment as
unconstitutionally requiring “state officers” to take action “in the
implementation of federal law.”114 Although it was local sheriffs in Arizona
and Montana who brought the lawsuit challenging the provisions under the
Act, throughout the opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia writing for the Court
referred to “state officers” being commanded to enforce by the federal statute,
which did refer to state officers in its text. Were those officers “the police
officers of the 50 states,” as the majority of the Supreme Court pointed out?
Are those chiefly “state officers”? Of course not: very few police in any state
report to state officials of any kind (aside from state troopers and the like);
for the most part, police are locally governed and constituted at the city and
county level. Only about eight percent of non-federal law enforcement
officers work for a state agency; the vast bulk work for local police agencies or
sheriff’s offices.115 The Printz case was not a case of a state being required to
“enact or administer a federal regulatory program,” but rather local
government agencies. The Court barely touched on the fact that this statute
was actually requiring “state or local officers” to provide enforcement
assistance.116 It was left to Justice John Paul Stevens in dissent to note,
although without much development of the point, that the relevant question
is whether Congress may “require local law enforcement officers to perform
certain duties during the interim needed for the development of a federal gun
control program.”117 Justice Stevens was the Justice to recognize something
not adequately appreciated: the Tenth Amendment cases are localism cases
in disguise as federalism cases. If so, I would argue that evidence about local
government practices, resources, or willingness to participate in the federal
scheme in question should have mattered.
Why does the Supreme Court so often label as federalism what is in
fact localism? One reason may be due to the complexity of the relationship
between state and local government. I would argue that “dual sovereignty”
does not adequately capture the distinctions between state and local
government and as a result, it does not adequately explain what burdens a
federal scheme may or may not impose on local government actors. The
Court could make its rulings both more practically relevant and careful if it
did attend to those complexities in an evidence-informed manner. In some
areas, the Court does so, as described in this Part. The next Part turns to the
521 U.S. 898, 912 (1996).
Bryan Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement, 2008, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2 (2008), at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf.
116 Id. at 926.
117 Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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methodological issues raised by using local evidence in constitutional
interpretation.
III.
METHODS
INTERPRETATION

FOR

USING LOCAL EVIDENCE

IN

CONSTITUTIONAL

There is a family resemblance in each of the areas discussed in Part II
in which local-level regulation and practice has been important in
constitutional interpretation. In each of those areas, it is local government
that makes critical decisions concerning the rights at stake, whether it is how
election recounts are conducted, whether to seek the death penalty, or
whether police officers should participate in a federal program. This Part
turns to questions regarding what methods should be used to assess local law
and practice, including how to decide which are the relevant types of
localities. Next, this Part describes the different status of local government
as laboratories of experimentation to develop new policies and potentially
influence constitutional norms. Third, this Part asks how one should
approach limiting the actions of outlier counties. Fourth, this Part asks what
empirical data could better inform these questions and it sets out an
empirical research agenda for further study of local-level law and practice.
A. Analyzing or Considering Local Law and Practice
Local constitutional law can provide different and perhaps better
answers in a range of areas of constitutional interpretation. In this Article, I
have not set out an overarching theory of constitutional law. I do not argue
that local practices always deserve deference; they may in fact highlight
greater conflict between what localities do and what the constitution
demands. In areas in which courts are simply examining the application of
constitutional text or structure, there may be no need to examine local
practice. Nor, conversely, does it take an approach in which policy outcomes
are crucial, to take local constitutional law seriously. Even if projected policy
outcomes are not part of the constitutional analysis, some deference or
consideration of local governments as important constitutional actors could
still play an important role.
One reason do to so would be to permit local participation in
developing norms and rules to inform constitutional questions. Some
scholars have argued, for example, that constitutional criminal procedure
rules should reflect some deference to community values and preferences.118
Others view local administrative rules as worthy of deference, in order to
incentivize local administrative process, and to promote local democratic

Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure,
86 G EO . L. J. 1153, 1184 (1998).
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engagement in decisions affecting constitutional rights. 119 Critics of such
approaches fear that “political pathologies” are known to affect local
governance, particularly in areas like policing and criminal justice. 120
Without taking a view on an administrative law-informed approach, for a
political process approach, focused on whether minorities are systematically
excluded from decisionmaking, attending to power dynamics at the local level
may be as important or more so than attending to such dynamics at the state
level.121 Attending to local practices does not mean deference or ratification
of those local practices.
Some answers to the questions posed about the use of state law would
come out differently if the court is focused instead upon localities as the
relevant unit of inquiry. When counting states, there are counting disputes,
including as described, questions about which states should be counted, how
they should be counted, and how many states adopting a position are
sufficient to suggest that their approach should be given weight in
constitutional analysis. The same and also different questions come up when
examining counties. The same questions arise regarding how to count local
government, including as between larger cities and more rural counties, and
whether focusing on population, density, or other features should matter
depending on what question one is asking.
New questions also arise, because while states are very different from
each other, the Constitution does give them equal sovereignty. Counties are
not sovereign and their status is very different and is not equal for all
purposes under state law. If one turns to other local actors, such as local
school boards, locally elected prosecutors, or Sheriff’s, still additional
questions arise, regarding the scope of their authority and sovereignty. Scale
should also matter. Richard Schragger points out that “obviously a city of 6
million persons is different from a city of 100,000 or a town of 400.”122 For
some questions, large urban counties may be relevant unit, such as questions
regarding what policies might be appropriately adopted for regulation of
municipal subway systems or video surveillance. For other questions, like
what policies are appropriate for police use of force, or what schools should do
to assist disabled students, practices across a wide range of jurisdictions
might be sensible subjects for careful evaluation.
B. Local Laboratories of Experimentation

See, e.g. Christopher Slobogin, Policing as Administration, 165 U. PA. L. R EV . 91 (2016);
Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing. 90 N.Y.U. L. R EV . 1827 (2015).
120 Wayne Logan, Fourth Amendment Localism, I NDIANA L. R EV . (forthcoming 2018).
121 Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 V A . L. R EV .
747, 747-48, 772-82 (1991).
122 Schragger, supra note xxx, at 1818.
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Scholars have begun to ask more questions about “who experiments”
when state laboratories of experimentation consider and adopt new policy.
The answer is often not state but rather local governments, whether it is
climate change adaptation and resilience planning, immigration, drug
enforcement, and oil and gas development. 123 Organizations of local
government actors, such as the U.S. Conference of Mayors, are also highly
influential in policy-making; Judith Resnik, Joshua Civin and Joseph Frueh
have called these translocal organizations of government actors (TOGAs).124
One often-neglected feature of localities as constitutional actors is that
local government is potentially more accountable to federal constitutional
norms than states. The sovereign immunity of states has a perverse and
often unnoticed side effect.
It renders states less accountable to
constitutional values (although they may still be enjoined through actions
under Ex Parte Young against individual state officials). But in contrast,
municipal “pattern and practice” liability under Section 1983 to civil rights
damages actions for their policies and practices, makes local government
more directly and derivatively accountable for constitutional law
violations. 125 This is a point not examined in the literature. States are
treated as sovereign, responsible for creating and regulating local
government, and are therefore treated as relevant for purposes of federalism
in constitutional doctrine.
Yet in some respects, localities are far more active as constitutional
actors (and accountable as constitutional actors). To be sure, state
governments are liable for injunctions if they engage in unconstitutional
executive actions, and state legislation can be constitutionally challenged.126
As a result of Monell pattern and practice liability, however, there are
reasons to think that cities and counties might be better exemplars of
experimentation with, but adherence to, constitutional norms.
What if local government units adopt very different law and policy
from each other? As Richard Briffault has developed, a defining feature of
“our localism” has been conflict between localities, including as between cities
and suburbs, over questions including school finance and zoning.127 Should
that conflict and the resulting diversity of approaches itself matter more on
some questions than the diversity of approaches as between states, or the
lack thereof? In my view, courts should both examine local practices but be
attentive to conflict and diversity, as with state law and practice. In the
Hannah J. Wiseman, Regulatory Islands, 89 NYU L. R EV . 1661 (2014).
Judith Resnik et al., Ratifying Kyoto at the Local Level: Sovereigntism, Federalism, and
Translocal Organizations of Government Actors (TOGAs), 50 A RIZ . L. R EV . 709, 711 (2008);
Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for
Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 S TAN L. R EV . 669 (2010).
125 See infra Part I.B. for a discussion of Monell liability.
126 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
127 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90
C OLUM . L. R EV . 1 (1990).
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death penalty area, therefore, it is precisely that a small number of counties
are outliers, and appear arbitrary as compared to how the death penalty is
applied across the rest of the state, that lends support to Eighth Amendment
arguments concerning the practice.
Should
local
governments
matter
as
laboratories
of
128
experimentation? In many ways, cities and counties are better situated to
engage in experimentation than are states. Municipalities are more closely
connected with communities and they are more diverse in their governing
arrangements. One concern with experimentation is always that there could
be a “race to the bottom” in which competition and outright conflict results in
negative results.129 That race to the bottom is generally examined at the
state level and not at the local level. There are perhaps fewer reasons for
that concern at the local or county level, given the greater local accountability
in local government.
That said, if local government engages in abuses that affect persons
that are not part of the political process, then there are special reasons to
intervene and not defer to their practices. That is what the Department of
Justices has done in the past with local policing agencies.130 That is also
what dormant commerce clause doctrine does; although it is often viewed as
ensuring against state protectionism, in many cases it is local government
that is at issue, and the dormant commerce clause serves to protect against
discrimination in favor of local business.131
C. Outlier Localities
Constitutional rulings often seek to identify various types of “outliers,”
or states that adopt measures that are infrequent. Attending to local
practices does not mean that local preferences are necessarily deserving of
deference. As Justin Driver has developed, “constitutional outliers” come in
several varieties and the Supreme Court’s practice is complex; sometimes the
problem is that a minority of states are “holdouts” that are the last to retain a
practice; sometimes it is a new “upstart” that breaks the prior mold;
sometimes it is a “backup” or an effort to do something novel to evade a
constitutional rule; and sometimes, in Driver’s valuable taxonomy, it is a
“throwback” effort to revive a largely abandoned approach.132 Each of those
Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama
Administration, 62 A LA . L. R EV . 237, 267 (2011).
129 Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking “The Race to the
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210, 1210-11
n.1 (1992).
130 Rachel Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Police Reform, 62 S TAN . L.
R EV . (2009).
131 See, e.g. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (striking down municipal
waste regulation that required waste to be processed at local transfer facility).
132 Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. C HI . L. R EV . 929 (2014).
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types of outlier treatments is be relevant as to localities. A locality could be a
“holdout,” retaining a practice that the vast majority have abandoned. A
locality might be a “throwback” reviving a constitutionally suspect practice.
If there is some consensus on the goal of a constitutional right, then
there may also be consensus that some level of departure from constitutional
norms is an outlier approach and unconstitutional. In the substantive due
process area, that is in effect what the Supreme Court did in Lawrence, when
it concluded that it was vanishingly rare for any locality to enforce antisodomy laws. Indeed, some have questioned whether Lawrence should be
seen as a ruling suppressing state outliers; as Justin Driver has argued, the
case involved “invalidation of thirteen state law.”133 However, if the problem
is seen as one that should be understood as not with state law on the books,
but a practice that was in fact highly aberrational at the local level, then the
opinion can properly be seen as an effort to enforce the constitution as
against outlier localities. Driver views this as a problem of “nonenforcement”
and that non-enforcement should not necessarily render a practice an outlier,
or as a fallback, that if it is to be considered, it would raise too many
complications to be useful, since one could have a measure that was adopted
in all fifty states but not enforced.134 I view the problem very differently.
Courts must look at the right unit of government when conducting
constitutional interpretation. Looking merely at the law on the (state) books
and not how it is operationalized at the relevant (local) level can entirely miss
the constitutional problem.
As I have described, it is not unduly complex but is in fact an accepted
approach in a range of constitutional areas to focus on local enforcement and
non-enforcement. I would counter that if a measure was in fact adopted in all
fifty states, but arbitrarily and locally enforced only in a few scattered
localities, that it should properly be scrutinized as a potential “outlier”
practice. To be sure, non-enforcement alone is not necessarily enough to
raise red flags. As David Strauss points out, “some restrictions may be
unenforced because they are so universally accepted that they are hardly ever
violated, such as laws forbidding slavery or cannibalism.”135
However, lack of enforcement, together with a trend away from the use
of a practice, and selective or rare use of a practice, can all contribute to
suspicion that the practice does not deserve the same deference when facing a
constitutional challenge.136 In the death penalty area, that is what the Court
did, without quite stating as much, in abolishing the juvenile death penalty,
which similarly few localities had imposed in recent decades, although a
quite a bit larger number of states retained the practice. I have argued that
the entire death penalty is now a phenomenon of a few outlier localities, and
Id. at 990.
Id. at 992.
135 Strauss, supra note xxx, at 877.
136 Id. at 878.
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for that reason it raises substantial arbitrariness concerns. More research
should be done regarding geographic variation in other areas of criminal
punishment. For example, there is evidence that life without parole
sentences are highly concentrated; in Texas, the bulk of such sentences come
from Harris County, for example.137
This discussion suggests that the consequences of attending to local
constitutional law is to punish outlier counties, but we should also think
about the converse: how to reward local government that adopts successful
practices. Courts may reward localities that do address the policy question
and attempt to protect constitutional norms, but suppress approaches that
are poorly designed to do so. One way to reward localities is through
dismissing constitutional claims against them and citing to their rules and
practices as an example. That does provide some incentive to localities.
However, a better way to reward such localities might be for state or
federal actors to actually reward them in the form of resources and grant
support. The only way to even conduct such analysis is to produce adequate
data on what local-level practices are and then evaluate them. In few areas,
have the courts insisted on any such thing. However, research institutes or
granting agencies could insist on such data and provide seed funding and
grant support for localities that do adopt evidence-based approaches.
One general approach towards promoting experimentation in
constitutional law is known as democratic experimentalism, which as
Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel explain, involves setting constitutional floors
but encouraging and empirically assessing progress above that floor. Certain
Supreme Court decisions that are expressed in prophylactic terms, like
Miranda v. Arizona, can be seen as setting a constitutional floor above which
jurisdictions are free to experiment.138 In response to the Court’s decision in
Miranda, Dorf and Sabel note: “there has been almost no actual
experimentation.”139 In fact, since they wrote their Article, there has been a
great deal of experimentation, but little of it that has been in any identifiable
way in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling Miranda, and much of it
occurring at the local level and not at the state level. That experience
provides a lesson how local constitutional law can develop.
The area of custodial interrogations has undergone a real revolution in
the past decade. Many local governments and some entire states have
adopted videotaping of interrogations. 140 They have done so because
videotaping has become fairly inexpensive, but also because of a large body of
research on what cases false confessions, together with examples of
Keri Blakinger, Harris County Leads Texas in Life Without Parole Sentences as Death
Penalty Recedes, Houston Chron., Jan. 11, 2018.
138 Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism,
98 C OLUM . L. R EV . 267, 453 (1998).
139 Id. at 462.
140 For an overview of these efforts, see Brandon L. Garrett, Confession Contamination
Revisited, 101 V A . L. R EV . 395 (2015).
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exonerations involving false confessions. 141 That said, constitutional law
could have facilitated this change in local practices. As a matter of
constitutional law, courts could have prioritized accurate evidence from
interrogations and encouraged local police to document and record
interrogations to ward off false confessions. Instead, the practical challenges
faced by government decisionmakers and changing research and technology,
and not constitutional law, has informed policy and practice. Nor was the
Miranda well suited towards providing guidance to agencies seeking to
improve interrogation practices; the ruling did not engage with local
government practices. Yet, almost in spite of the Supreme Court’s Fifth
Amendment regulation, which is highly complex, but not informative of best
practices, there has been an enormous amount of experimentation that
actually has improved interrogation practices. Constitutional law has little
influence over interrogation practice and policy—but it could if it attended to
the right local practices.
There are some advantages to preferring localism in constitutional law
that does try to reward experimentation. Local government may have
substantial leeway in how it sets its policy, making local government far
more able to experiment broadly in policy and in law. As Wayne Logan
explains, “Although the substance of local laws must comport with state and
federal constitutional expectations, local governments typically are limited
only to the extent that their laws are preempted by or conflict with extant
state law.” 142 Local government may be a far more capable and flexible
laboratory for experimentation than state government.
D. A Local Empirical Research Agenda
One challenge in many of the areas developed in this Article is a lack
of data concerning local law and practice. Even on high-profile topics like the
death penalty, scholars (like this author) had to painstakingly hand-collect
county-level data because it did not already exist. In some areas, including in
criminal law and procedure, there has been an endemic lack of adequate data
to study important questions, including constitutional questions.143 Courts
may defer, in the name of localism, to local practices without realizing that
they are in fact outlier practices.
Some federal agencies conduct surveys of counties that can provide
valuable information. For example, the Department of Agriculture tracks
socioeconomic indicators like poverty, unemployment, median household
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income and education, at the county level.144 The Department of Commerce
collects county-level economic data on employment, business patterns, and
building permits.145 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
collects county-level data on a wide range of health issues, including alcohol
use, births, cancer, chronic diseases, deaths and mortality, immunizations,
obesity, physical activity, and other data. 146 In criminal justice, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations
maintains data on county-level arrests and offenses in its Uniform Crime
Reporting Program. 147 County-level data on voting patterns in federal
elections is available and many states make election results available online,
with voting district-level results as well. 148 The DOJ Bureau of Justice
Statistics conducts census studies of local criminal justice actors, including
public defender offices, publicly funded crime laboratories, local law
enforcement agencies, and problem-solving courts.149
Researchers are receptive to interest by the judiciary. If courts express
interest in taking account of patterns of local practices, then researchers will
do more work to measure and evaluate those local practices. That has
occurred in the death penalty area, where two generations of academic
researchers have conducted state-level and national studies of death
sentencing patterns. There will also be more pressure for localities to make
data and practices public and available to researchers, if they are relevant to
judicial decisionmaking. Research grants and non-profits interested in
funding salient academic research will similarly provide resources to conduct
local government research if it could inform constitutional doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The local matters in constitutional interpretation. I have described
how local governments are commonly actors in constitutional litigation. For
that reason, their interests can receive some deference and they can shape
the litigation. When local government practices inform doctrine, however, it
does so as a type of evidence. I classify and discuss examples of four types of
use of local evidence in constitutional law, in which courts: (1) examine
patterns of local law and practice; (2) examine best practices at the local level
to influence the appropriate constitutional floor; (3) examine county-level
Department of Agriculture, County-level Data Sets, at https://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/county-level-data-sets/.
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enforcement to assess whether a state law is an outlier that is rarely enforced
at the local level; (4) use local remedies and needs to inform constitutional
norm-development.
The use of local evidence in constitutional interpretation can itself be
far more evidence-based. Courts can and do attend to patterns in local
decisionmaking, but they often neglect to do so in areas in which the local
could meaningfully inform the analysis. In doing so, there are important
methodological limitations and challenges. In many areas, there is a genuine
lack of data concerning local rules and practices. To set a constitutional floor
without such information can be mistaken. However, if courts demand data,
then there will be pressure to collect it and the resources and incentives to
analyze it. Whether courts then make good use of data is another question.
The death penalty context provides a case study in how better local-level data
can inform important questions of police and constitutional rights; whether
these data will inform constitutional analysis remains to be seen.
We learn important things about constitutional rights by
disaggregating state and local interests. Local governments are often the
relevant decisionmakers and their incentives and structures matter to ensure
compliance with constitutional values. However, it is not enough to preserve
the role of local government by relying on local actors as defense litigants in
constitutional cases. We need to know whether the rules or practices of a
litigant are representative before crediting them. We can obtain a better
sense of how constitutional rights are implemented on the ground by paying
attention to local patterns of enforcement or practice. Nor should we neglect,
however, the role that state-level resources and law plays in setting practices.
We can neglect the way in which there is a great deal of heterogeneity among
local governments, ranging from rural counties to urban cities. Improved
data collection should attend to all of those questions.
The local matters in constitutional law, but it does not consistently
matter, and local governments sometimes receive deference without good
evidence of the state of local law and practice. Local evidence can be used,
not just to defer to localities, but to reach better results in constitutional law.
Local evidence can be used more accurately and effectively. Judges, lawyers,
and researchers should take more account of evidence from the local, even
when interpreting the Constitution. In making local constitutional law more
evidence-informed, judges can avoid the selective use of the local in
constitutional law. That alone would be an enormous improvement in the
use of local evidence in constitutional interpretation.
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